World attention in the Middle East has been principally focused on Israel, Gaza, the West Bank, and Iran. Syria has not received the same level of attention, certainly not from Western media outlets. Yet Syria is critical to how the future of this region evolves, and the next few weeks will tell us much.
Where Syria was and where it is now
The authoritarian Bashar al-Assad regime stayed in power by promoting the interests of certain groups over others, and was brutal in its effects on Syrian society. As noted by the New York Times, the long civil war that began with the Arab Spring and lasted over 13 years “killed more than 500,000 and displaced half the country, and its proxies forcibly disappeared more than 100,000 people.”
Assad was overthrown in December 2024 by a coalition led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani, the leader of Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), a terrorist Sunni militia organization. Since the fall of the Assad regime, al-Sharaa has now taken on the role of “president” during a transition period, with the first parliamentary election voting scheduled in mid-September.
Up to this point, al-Sharaa has benefitted from Donald Trump’s decision to terminate the U.S. Syria Sanctions Program, effective July 1, 2025. With HTS’s removal from the terrorist list, major Syrian cities are returning to more normal economic life; and investors from the Gulf and Turkey have been lining up to proffer substantial funds.
Israel and Syria were talking in Paris in mid-August; according to Israeli Minister for Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer, these meetings were focused on “enhancing stability in the region.” Just recently, The Times of Israel reported that Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa confirmed that Syria and Israel were in “advanced” talks on a security agreement, and that Sky News Arabic quoted him as saying that “any deal would be based on the 1974 disengagement lines that Jerusalem and Damascus agreed to after the Yom Kippur War a year earlier.”Sharaa also reportedly said that, although he did not believe the time was right for a peace deal with Israel, he “will not hesitate” to make any agreement that benefits Syria and the region.
Although this statement shows al-Sharaa has been pragmatic in certain regards, internally he is increasingly now seen as authoritarian, unwilling to hold in check his former Sunni militia. Members of the militia have engaged in violent actions against the Alawite community in Latakia (who are Shia Muslims), and in Suwayda, against the Druze community, a minority religious group.
Whether he is ready to rein in such actions and hold fair and violence-free upcoming elections (assuming they will be held as scheduled) remains unknown. The reality of the elections will tell us much about Syria’s future for a very long time, and well beyond.
Group Identities and Prospects for a Common Syria
To understand “Syria” is to be aware of its varied culture. It is comprised of Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and Assyrians, with religious communities that include Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims, Christians, and Druze.
Each group has its own history, culture, and set of grievances and mistrust of others. For the creation of a new, functioning national government, such ethnic and religious diversity presents an enormous challenge, making it exceedingly hard to work together. A sense of how difficult it will be to do so is touched on below:
Alawites: The Alawite minority, a sect of Shia Islam, is where the Assad family drew its support. This group has long held key positions in the military and government.
Sunni Arabs: The largest religious group in Syria, Sunni Arabs were significantly affected during the civil war. Many groups within this demographic are divided from each other; some supported the insurgency against the Assad regime, while others did not, depending on local contexts.
Druze: The third-largest religion in Syria is the Druze, with roughly 3.2% of the population. Although the Druze, a monotheistic and Abrahamic religion, are a minority in Syria, there are sizable Druze communities in Lebanon and Israel.
Kurdish Groups: Kurdish populations hold significant territory in northern Syria. For some time, they have been self-governing and had political autonomy and control of resources. That history complicates relations with current and future national governments.
Christian Communities: Various Christian groups include the Greek Orthodox, Armenian, and Assyrian communities. In the past, they have tended to be more supportive of the Assad regime because they saw it as providing greater protection against Islamic extremist groups.
But this is not the end of the list. More groups complicate the picture even more.
Other Groups Likely to Resist Any New Government
Sunni Rebel Groups: Sunni groups that were part of the initial uprising against Assad remain opposed to any regime that they perceive as not entirely to their liking, with relations with Israel being a concerning factor.
Islamist Groups: Extremist factions, such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (formerly linked to Al-Qaeda), are unlikely to support the government, seen as secular or aligned with foreign powers, and similarly any rapprochement with Israel.
As if all this wasn’t enough, other external factors need to be taken into account.
Neighboring countries and the external players.
Neighboring Israel and Turkey are two countries with direct border involvement with Syria, and are discussed specifically below. Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, the United States, the European Union, and international institutions (financial, non-governmental, faith-based) have essential roles in shaping Syria’s political and economic future.
Israel: The Syrian relationship with Israel has been and is tenuous and unresolved.
Following the fall of the Assad regime, Israel expanded its control of areas in the Golan Heights beyond the 1967 original buffer zone. It has recently intervened with airstrikes on Damascus in support of Druze community interests. Notwithstanding, there are signs of partial agreement to address security matters. Nevertheless, going forward, it will be difficult for any Syrian government to stay at arm’s length over Israel’s takeover of Gaza City and its plan to control all of Gaza, and the unfolding humanitarian crisis.
For Israel, its immediate interest is in seeking security along the border with Syria with limited Syrian military presence (if any) in Syria’s south. Further, it wants reassurance for the safety of Syria’s Druze population, and limited or no Iranian influence in Syria. If there are bilateral openings, Israeli interest may be more in avenues for trade and economic interaction.
Turkey: Turkey’s support for certain rebel factions during the civil war and its Kurdish policies significantly complicate its relationship with Syria.
At the core is Turkey’s primary concern with Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria. Turkey fears the spillover of Kurdish nationalism within its borders. A new Syrian government that reassures Turkey regarding the muting of Kurdish ambitions would be the basis for enhanced cooperative engagement.
Turkey currently hosts millions of Syrian refugees and would have interests in their repatriation, which would be an incentive for a more stable relationship.
The outsiders, namely Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, the United States, the European Union, the international and regional financial institutions, and possibly others, will have their own and probably different policies and interests to weigh in determining future relations with Syria.
In sum, Syria’s future will depend on how deft any new government is at compromise and negotiations in stitching together diverse needs and concerns of its citizenry, dealing with external pressures, and beginning to build a cohesive national identity.
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Are There Tools to Do This?
If President al-Sharaa or any future government is to succeed, it will need to:
- Bring ethnic and religious groups into the fold, including empowering lawmaking bodies that are representative and inclusive of diverse communities.
- Develop a national narrative that acknowledges and celebrates the country’s diversity. Educational campaigns can emphasize shared historical experiences, cultural exchanges, and a common future.
- Establish mechanisms for dialogue and reconciliation. The mechanisms can help address historical grievances and may involve truth and reconciliation commissions or local community initiatives to foster understanding.
- Address economic disparities by investing in marginalized regions and communities. Such investing can reduce grievances. Equitable resource distribution can foster a sense of belonging among different groups.
- Promote civic education that fosters tolerance and acceptance. Such education can help bridge divides. Encouraging the teaching of shared values in schools may ignite a sense of national pride.
- Allow some level of local governance to empower minority groups and reduce feelings of disenfranchisement.
- Support cultural programs that highlight the contributions of various ethnic and religious groups to foster a spirit of inclusivity and national identity.
What “ifs”
It was a loosely knit coalition that achieved victory in Syria’s civil war, but that does not necessarily translate into civility in the following days.
A continuation of feuds in a fractured society with no unifying entity capable of governing will only invite disruption and disaster — especially if it is coupled, as it is likely to be, with its neighbors’ and outsiders’ divisive interference.
If this were to happen, it would not just be Syria, but the entire Middle East, that would be in turmoil for years to come.
If only half of the measures described above are begun or intended, the prospects for a more promising future are possible. One can hope that, after years of civil war and a brutal regime, the human and community benefits of compromise for all Syrians would outweigh continuing conflict.
Editor’s Note: The opinions expressed here by the authors are their own, not those of Impakter.com — Cover Photo Credit: Ahmed akacha.
