“Now I shall go far and far into the North, playing the Great Game,” wrote Rudyard Kipling, recipient of the 1907 Nobel Prize in Literature, in his 1901 novel, “Kim.”
In subsequent years, foreign‑policy writers picked up on the term to describe the 19th-century rivalry between the British and Russian Empires as they competed for influence across Central and South Asia. The “new Great Game” in the twenty-first century has its epicenter in Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Iran.
With the emergence of middle powers, the world is very different today. In 2026, at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney delivered a widely noted speech, underscoring the growing role of middle powers and the need for them to act together.
Indeed, middle-power nations have nearly doubled over the last decades, from 9 in 1991 to 16 today, with many seeking to maintain relationships with all major powers to create space for independent action. A new report by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), “The Great Fragmentation: The Rise of Middle Powers in a Fractured International Order,” describes a redistribution of influence as superpowers reach plateaus and middle powers collectively widen their global impact.
But while big powers still dominate, Central Asia has emerged as a crossroads for global power confrontations. This is a continuation of the past: a struggle for influence over the world’s most strategic landmass, updated for the 21st century with pipelines, fiber‑optic cables, sanctions, drones, digital surveillance, and the need for uranium and growing dependence on rare earth elements.
A Familiar Multipolar Contest
The original Great Game pitted the British and Russian Empires against each other for control of Eurasia’s heartland. The modern version involves China, Russia, the United States, India, Turkey, Iran, and the Central Asian and Gulf states, all of which are competing simultaneously — economically, politically, and technologically.
Yet the underlying logic is unchanged. Geography still determines strategy. Trade routes still shape global politics. And local rulers still play external powers against one another to preserve autonomy.
Central Asia’s presidents, Afghanistan’s factions, and Iran’s government are not passive participants. They are part of a crowded field of suitors, rivals, and would‑be patrons.
China, Russia, and the United States
China is probably now the most transformative force in the region. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has contributed to railways across Kazakhstan, strategic natural gas corridors from Turkmenistan, and digital surveillance systems from Tashkent to Dushanbe. Its strategy resembles Britain’s in the 19th century — e.g., securing trade routes, stabilizing buffer zones, and preventing rival powers from dominating the region — but with economic tools rather than military ones.
Russia, despite its invasion of Ukraine and some changing trends towards the West in the Caucasus (Armenia), remains a principal regional security power. It has made commitments to modernize the rail and port infrastructure along the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which connects Russia to Asia via the Caspian Sea and Iran. It maintains military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, controls labor migration flows, and exerts cultural influence. Moscow’s role today echoes its imperial past, e.g., as protector, patron, and gatekeeper of regional security.
The United States has renewed its focus on the region to counter the influence of others across Eurasia’s corridors. In 2015, the United States and the five Central Asian nations — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan — established the C5+1 framework, in part to limit Russian and Chinese influence. Since then, C5+1 has evolved “from a consultative-level forum to a more operationally oriented framework focusing on economic diversification, connectivity, and critical minerals.”
With respect to critical minerals, at present, two Central Asian countries are crucial to meeting global uranium needs: Kazakhstan, the world’s leading uranium producer accounting for 43% of global production, and Uzbekistan, the fifth-largest global supplier. Further, in 2025, Kazakhstan announced the potential discovery of deposits of almost one million tons of key rare earth elements, and possibly much more which, if confirmed, would place Kazakhstan “among the world’s top three countries in terms of rare earth reserves.” These rich deposits of crucial ores have attracted heightened U.S. interest, underscored by new public and private billion-dollar investments in a Kazakhstani tungsten mining venture.
As Ernest Scheyder wrote in his book, “The War Below,” the “war below” mirrors the “war above.”
Turkey and the Gulf States: New Cards
Turkey has emerged as another significant interactor through diplomacy, defense exports, and cultural networks. Ankara has positioned itself as a bridge between Central Asia and the wider world and has done so in various ways, including by supplying drones for warfare in the Caucasus and reshaping identity politics across the steppe.
The Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, are another major new factor in the region, deploying capital as a form of geopolitical leverage. Their oil wealth has been translated into vast investments in logistics hubs, renewable energy, and mining, giving them significant influence. This is new in the Great Game: money as strategy.
Afghanistan: The Pivot of Instability
Afghanistan’s geography connects Central Asia, South Asia, Iran, and China. The Taliban’s return to power has had repercussions that extend far beyond Afghanistan’s borders. Many continue to seek influence in Afghanistan to prevent further destabilization of the region. It can look to its history: Afghanistan was a major factor during the nineteenth century as a buffer, a battleground, and a barometer of imperial strategy.
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Iran: A Regional Militant Theocracy
Iran long played a role in the old Great Game; today, it has become one of the central — if not the central — foci of the new Great Game. Its geography, including its position on the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz and its access routes to the Caucasus and Central Asia, gives it leverage over global energy markets and regional trade.
The U.S./Israeli-Iran war has further highlighted Iran’s importance to global energy flows and accelerated its deepening ties with China, Russia, and India. Through Shia Islam, the theological foundation for networks beyond its borders, Iran extends its influence through military reach, drones, and proxies. This religious dimension — absent from the 19th-century Great Game — adds another layer of complexity to an already multifaceted contest.
Pipelines, Corridors, and Digital Silk Roads: The Stakes Are Global
Today’s struggle in Central Asia is a global one. The region’s stability affects energy markets, supply chains, counterterrorism efforts, and the balance of power among the world’s major states.
The “new Great Game” is fundamentally economic. It is about influence, access, and connectivity. Major connectivity projects define the contest, such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative — railways, pipelines, and digital infrastructure linking China to Europe — or Russia’s Eurasian and North–South corridors, designed to preserve Moscow’s role as Central Asia’s connective hub. The primary weapons are investment, infrastructure, sanctions, and technology, but driven by the same strategic imperatives that animated the old one.
These corridors are today’s Silk Roads. Whoever shapes and owns them will shape the future of Eurasian trade — and global power.
Editor’s Note: The opinions expressed here by the authors are their own, not those of impakter.com
