Proposing a New Security Mechanism to Address the UN’s Crisis Response Problem

Since 2003, the Gaza Strip has been devastated by the Israel-Hamas war and for many years before, traditional external efforts to address the situation have failed. To pursue a limited, new, admittedly vague approach, a “Board of Peace” mandate was broadly approved in November 2025 by the UN Security Council (Resolution No. 2803). The essence was to support a transitional governance and an International Stabilization Force to handle security, demilitarization and aid in Gaza.

Subsequently, at the World Economic Forum in January 2026, the United Stated presented and was able to garner signatories for what was then referred to as a Board of Peace for Gaza. This was initially presented as a limited body tasked with overseeing the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, but a more recent draft charter has been expanded to have it tackle conflicts the world over, without mentioning Gaza. Now the United States has invited participants to a first meeting on February 19, 2026, to be held at the U.S. Institute of Peace, which President Donald Trump has renamed after himself.

The possible implications of this broadened role of the Board of Peace are monumental for the existing global security framework. It is important to acknowledge that the United Nations has long struggled with ways to mobilize rapid, flexible, and politically insulated funding for urgent security and humanitarian crises. Traditional funding mechanisms — assessed contributions, voluntary donations, and ad hoc pledges — remain slow, unpredictable, and vulnerable to geopolitical bargaining, and the UN’s core institutions and organizations have been losing public support and funding.

A Board of Peace as now envisioned would undermine the function of existing UN mechanisms; unless alternative ways within and by the UN are considered, the handwriting on the wall for the UN role in future crises is dismal.

A multicurrency, multi-asset UN Security Fund (UN-SRF)

Here is an idea fraught with “wishful thinking,” but it contains kernels of potential value worth pursuing. A UN Security Response Fund (UN-SRF), capable of accepting national currencies, reserve currencies, cryptocurrencies, and private contributions, represents a radical innovation in global governance and international finance.

At first glance, the hurdles may prove insurmountable, raising fundamental questions about monetary sovereignty, financial stability, sanctions enforcement, and the political economy of global governance. But let’s take a look:

UN Security Response Fund concept

A new UN Security Response Fund (UN-SRF) would be explicitly tied to urgent security needs. It could provide rapid financing for peacekeeping, stabilization, and humanitarian operations; reduce dependence on slow-moving assessed contributions; enable public–private burden sharing, especially for politically sensitive missions; and allow innovative financing, including digital assets, to expand the donor base.

Such an UN-SRF could accept national currencies, reserve currencies, and possibly other financial instruments. It could permit donors to contribute in the form most convenient to them; tap into private wealth, including crypto-based philanthropy; reduce transaction costs for cross-border transfers; increase transparency through blockchain-based auditing; and provide resilience against currency volatility by diversifying holdings.

Governance and accountability challenges

The UN Secretary-General (SYG) would be responsible for an UN-SRF with defined discretionary authority to identify a situation, seek financing approval from a UNSF select committee, and ensure that specific financing is time-limited and reviewed periodically.

SYG would be supported by a small but expert management team. Rules and regulations would address how it would handle donor-driven agendas, conflicts of interest, influence from corporate interests, and reputational risks. The need for effective oversight and transparency would be paramount and supported by regular external, arms-length auditing.

With respect to the financial resources provided, guidelines for portfolio management would be developed to consider a diversified reserve strategy, risk-management frameworks, appropriate custodial arrangements, and cybersecurity.

Possible major country reactions

In considering how countries would react, it is critical to keep in mind that, once the UN-SRF comes into existence, no country would have veto power, as some do in the UN Security Council.

• The United States could consider UN-SRF as a mechanism to reduce pressure on U.S. bilateral aid budgets. On the other hand, acceptance could undermine U.S. sanctions enforcement, weaken the dollar’s dominance if alternative assets gain traction, and create influence channels for adversarial actors through private contributions.
• The European Union (EU) would support the fund in principle but oppose accepting unregulated crypto–assets. It would emphasize the need for strong regulatory safeguards.
• China’s reaction would be shaped by the acceptance of the digital yuan’s promotion. China would resist if the mechanism were perceived as undermining its geopolitical activities.
• Russia would likely support it if it reduces reliance on the dollar, and accepts alternative currencies and private contributions that bypass Western sanctions. It would be wary of transparency requirements that expose illicit finance.
• Emerging economies would see opportunities and risks, with pluses from greater access to crisis-response funding, but concerns about dependence on another outsider, and in particular, private donors.

Pollyanna, maybe, but we need fresh thinking

A UN Security Response Fund capable of accepting national currencies, reserve currencies, and private contributions would represent a bold step toward modernizing the UN’s place in global crisis financing. It aligns with the need for rapid, flexible funding mechanisms, especially in sensitive contexts. 

That said, given the speed with which the Board of Peace for Gaza was established (at least on paper), this is not without significance for the UN in considering what might be possible in the future. In some respects, the Board of Peace concept represents both the promise and the peril of hybrid financing. If a carefully designed UN-SRF could be implemented — with strong oversight, transparency, and regulatory alignment — a multicurrency UN-SRF could enhance global peace and security and justify the vision and trust in the United Nations of its founders eighty years ago.