Trump’s Board of Peace Explained: Mandate, Power, and Global Implications

Gaza has endured huge human and physical damage. Whatever your view may be as to the underlying causes, the reality is that this cannot be allowed to continue. New ways must be found to bring about peace and reconstruction, in Gaza and around the world.

In October 2025, United States President Donald Trump unveiled his 20-point Plan for peace and reconstruction in Gaza. But the plan lacked international endorsement and legitimacy, thereby risking unwillingness of countries to provide troops to the International Stabilization Force (ISF) expected to be established under the 20-point Plan. Thus, the United States was in effect forced to bring the Plan and the Board of Peace (BoP) to the United Nations Security Council for support and, if possible, endorsement. A Trump Administration with negative views of the United Nations (UN) found that it had strong interest in UN support of an American initiative.

The United States apparently endeavored to structure the UN Security Council debate on the Trump 20-point plan to limit the discussion. A subject which might have taken weeks or even months was limited to only four days after a week of informal consultations, in the interest of sustaining the fragile ceasefire between Israeli and Hamas forces and moving ahead with prisoner exchange and other key operational aspects of the Plan.

The US introduction of the long resolution did not explain or expand on the text beyond stating that an earlier US draft had been amended in consultation with Council members. Alluding to objections and reservations by other UN Security Council members, the US statement asserted simply that “attempts to sow discord” when agreement on the resolution was under active negotiation have “grave, tangible, and entirely avoidable consequences.” The US statement did not even mention the BoP.

The Council’s limited discussion on the US draft resolution hardly focused on the BoP, naturally giving its attention principally to the ISF and related matters. Lack of clarity was mentioned as a concern by several members. For example, as even the UN press summary reported, Slovenia’s representative called for “clear terms of reference” for the Board of Peace, stressing the need for “inclusivity, transparency and good faith.” Somalia’s representative expressed concern over its “limited clarity” regarding the role of the United Nations, as well as that of the Palestinian Authority.

Russia introduced a resolution that was an alternative to the US proposal in the Council. In light of widespread Russian objections to expansion of UN authority, it is ironic that the Russian resolution would have expanded UN authority and replaced the US-controlled BoP. While the Russian proposal was ultimately not put to a vote in the Council, it would have explicitly removed all references to the BoP. Russia criticized the BoP, like some other Council members, as an “unclear administrative [setup] that bypassed the UN.”

In lieu of the ISF under the authority of the BoP, the Russian proposal requested that the UN Secretary-General identify options for an ISF. The Russians aimed to bring the ISF discussion under standard UN statutory control and accountability. Russia criticized the process in the Council also, as rushed, indeed ultimatum-like, to advance the American draft, without genuine discussion, without addressing the substantive concerns of other delegations, and under direct threats of renewed large-scale bloodshed in Gaza.

Similarly, China criticized the US resolution, on several points: The draft resolution was said to be “vague and unclear on many critical elements.” Despite repeated requests from Council members for more information, no response was said to have been made from the penholder (the United States). China said that the draft resolution failed to ensure the effective participation of the UN and its Security Council. It merely requested the Council to authorize the BoP to assume full responsibility for the civil administration in Gaza, but it stipulated no oversight or review mechanism beyond annual written reports.

As Russia, China and others complained, the US draft resolution was stated not to be the product of full consultations among Council members. Less than two weeks after introducing the draft resolution, the Russians commented that the penholder rushed the Council into making a critical decision on the future and destiny of Gaza.

In the end, the Council strongly endorsed the US proposal after fairly minor amendments. Only two countries failed to vote in favor. China and Russia could have vetoed the resolution but abstained, allowing the resolution to pass, presumably under pressure from Arab countries and Turkey.

So, What Did the Security Council Resolution Do?

The Council’s Resolution, No. 2803, is long, complex and in some respects vague. This may have been intentional, to permit positive votes from some Council members who had doubts and questions about it. It appears to have been written quickly and then amended in consultations among the parties principally concerned — Israel, Arab governments, and Turkey. It gives at least indirect legitimacy to President Trump’s 20-point Plan, which is annexed to the Resolution with indirect but not explicit endorsement. The resolution welcomes — again without explicit endorsement — the Board of Peace proposed by President Trump as the institutional vehicle to carry forward the President’s Plan. The language on key points, below, on the Board of Peace merits close reading.

First, the Council welcomed “the establishment of the Board of Peace (BoP) as a transitional governance administration with international legal personality that will set the framework and coordinate funding for the redevelopment of Gaza pursuant to the Comprehensive Plan, until such time as the Palestinian Authority has satisfactorily completed its reform program, the satisfaction of which shall be acceptable to the BoP.“

Second, the Council authorized “Member States participating in the BoP and the BoP to …. enter into such arrangements as may be necessary to achieve the objectives of the Comprehensive Plan, including those addressing privileges and immunities of [the International Stabilization Force – ISF]; and …. establish operational
entities with, as necessary, international legal personality and transactional authorities for the performance of its functions, including …. the implementation of a transitional governance administration, including the supervising and supporting of a Palestinian technocratic, apolitical committee of competent Palestinians from the Strip.”

Third, the Council understood “that the operational entities [for Gaza] …. will operate under the authority and oversight of the BoP and are to be funded through voluntary contributions from donors and BoP funding vehicles and governments”; and called “upon the World Bank and other financial institutions to facilitate and provide financial resources to support the reconstruction and development of Gaza.”

Fourth, the Council gave the BoP a life of two years until the end of 2027, with possibilities for extension, and requested updates from the BoP on its work every six months.

Mandate of the Board of Peace in the UN Security Council Resolution

The mandate of the BoP is not set out specifically in the Security Council Resolution but is established by implication in the tasks and roles assigned to it by the Security Council, in the language set out above, summarized as: establishment, operation and supervision of the ISF for Gaza: implementation of a “transitional governance administration” for Gaza, including supervision of a technocratic, apolitical committee of competent Palestinians from the Strip to begin to serve as its civil administration; financing of the BoP and entities under its supervision by voluntary contributions and engagement of the World Bank and other donors.

According to the Council, the BoP is an “international organization” with privileges and immunities to be negotiated.

Establishment of the Board of Peace

In late January, President Trump signed the “Charter” of the BoP at a public ceremony on the margins of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. The United States had invited 60 countries to join as founding members. Attendance at the inaugural ceremony was limited to about 20 countries, mostly Islamic countries from the Middle East. Other than Kosovo, US allies from Europe and Canada did not attend. Holding the Charter of the BoP aloft, Trump said with his usual tendency towards overstatement:

“We’re announcing more details regarding the Board of Peace. …. This Board has the chance to be one of the most consequential bodies ever created and it’s my enormous honor to serve as its Chairman.”

But, the statements at the signing ceremony gave few details on the Charter of the BoP.

Mandate and Leadership of the BoP in its Charter

While the entirety of the January 2026 UN Security Council resolution was limited to Gaza, apparently without consultation with the Council or the UN Secretary-General, the BoP Charter sent to some 60 countries invited to the Davos ceremony gave the BoP a world-wide writ:

“The Board of Peace is an international organization that seeks to promote stability, restore dependable and lawful governance, and secure enduring peace in areas affected or threatened by conflict.”

The text makes clear the founder’s intention to establish a new international organization; the preambular paragraphs refer indirectly to failures by the UN. The United Nations is not mentioned at all in the text. The text gives the impression of having been written hurriedly, without the care that one would expect for an entity established with a Charter that describes itself as an international organization.

The Charter of the BoP establishes President Trump as the leader of the BoP with authority to initiate and to veto BoP action on virtually any matter. He is the Inaugural Chair, and he designates his successor. Membership is limited to states invited by the Chair. He may also uninvite them, as in the case of Canada after his tiff with Prime Minister Mark Carney following Carney’s Davos address.

Member states are represented by their head of state or government. Member States may be represented by an alternate high-ranking official, but this decision is subject to approval by the Chair. Member states serve for three years, subject to renewal by the Chair. The three-year limit does not apply to states contributing one billion dollars. The Chair may terminate membership of a member state, subject only to a possible override by two-thirds of the member states. Decisions of the BoP are to be made by a two-thirds majority of its members, subject to a veto by the Chair. The Chairman has “exclusive authority to create, modify, or dissolve subsidiary entities.”

Membership

A week after its official inauguration at Davos, the United States announced that 26 countries had been designated as Founding Members. The list included Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Albania, Bahrain, Belarus, Bulgaria, Cambodia, El Salvador, Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Mongolia, Morocco, Pakistan, Paraguay, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam, spanning the Middle East, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Caucasus.

Major OECD countries have not joined; the only OECD members that have joined are the US, Hungary, and Turkey. As of early February, the United States was the only member of the P5 veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council to have joined. Neither Russia nor China has yet done so, and France and the UK have distanced themselves from Trump’s initiative.

France has been particularly outspoken. French President Emmanuel Macron refused the invitation to join the BoP, stating he believes [correctly, as the text shows!] that its Charter extends beyond Gaza and risks undermining the United Nations. The BoP questions existing multilateral structures, which France champions. France wants to support peace, he said, but insists on effective multilateralism through the UN, not a new body that could challenge it.

Trump rescinded the invitation to Canada after Prime Minister Mark Carney’s Davos speech criticizing the US without naming it. Israel has indicated that it will join the BoP. Within Israel, the country was thought to have no option but to join and that the BoP might serve to counter concerns about UN influence in Gaza. Plans for Israeli membership have inevitably led to concerns among Palestinians. Russia has not yet joined, despite Putin’s reportedly saying that Moscow was ready to join with an allocation of $1 billion from Russian assets frozen by the Biden administration; these funds had previously been under consideration for use in reconstruction of Ukraine. Apparently, negotiations between Russia and the US are under way on the terms of Russia’s membership.

External Partners and Financial Structure

While membership in the BoP is limited to states, key outside leaders are expected to engage. Those under discussion include Gulf State financiers, Israeli and Palestinian business leaders, former diplomats from the European Union and United States, American private-sector executives who are known to Trump (most probably from the real estate, construction, and infrastructure technology sectors), and military advisers. Trump’s son-in-law would be one of its architects, not a voting member.

Specifics are lacking but BoP memberships might be in different categories. Three possibilities have been mentioned beyond the formality of member state membership:

1. Capital-Commitment Model: entities pledging a minimum reconstruction fund (e.g., $50 million) rather than paying an administrative fee.
2. Endowment Model: founding members required to make a one-time seed payment (e.g., $1 billion), with future costs covered by investment returns.
3. Zero-Fee Advisory Model: members volunteer time and cover their own travel while hired staff handle operations, funded by donors.

Because no bylaws or budgets are public, the fee question remains hypothetical, probably in negotiation among Trump family members and friends, as well as American and Middle Eastern diplomats.

Critiques of the Board of Peace

While the BoP has yet to become operational, it has already been the subject of much criticism. Major OECD countries, especially France and the Scandinavians, have expressed concerns about the BoP’s relations with the UN and have seen it as an endeavor by Trump, who has long disliked the UN, as an effort to replace the UN.

As far as Gaza is concerned, Palestinians have expressed worries that the BoP would have complete authority over the distribution of humanitarian assistance in Gaza; UN agencies such as UNRWA would be required to operate under the oversight of the BoP. This would automatically lead to conflict with the UN, which generally sees itself at least as primus inter pares in any international grouping of which it is a part; in practice, however, the UN must accept the kind of networked multilateralism which the BoP may claim.

Al Shabaka, the Palestinian policy network, comments: “Notably absent from the BoP’s design is any meaningful system of accountability — whether to Palestinians, to international institutions, or to universal legal standards.” Advocates for Palestine observe that Palestinian participation is to be tightly limited and heavily conditioned, confined to “technocratic” and “apolitical” roles. Thus, it is argued, Palestinian involvement would be subject to continuous external supervision and effective exclusion of any representatives with democratic legitimacy or political agency.

Other critics argue that the establishment of the BoP constitutes overreach of authority. Security Council Resolution 2803 granted the BoP a limited mandate to address the end of the conflict in the Gaza Strip within the Israeli-Palestinian context. In contrast, the BoP Charter expands its mandate to serve as a global mechanism for conflict resolution outside the UN framework, without mentioning Gaza or referring to Resolution 2803. This expansion, in the absence of an additional Security Council resolution, is perceived as exceeding the BoP’s original mandate and the understandings that underpinned support for Resolution 2803.

In Israel, the expansion of the BoP mandate has been viewed as an attempt to establish an alternative, rather than merely a complementary, mechanism to the UN and its institutions, even though they were designated in the UN Charter as the central framework for maintaining international peace and security. Although the BoP’s Charter does not explicitly mention the UN, it emphasizes the need to depart from “institutions that have too often failed” and to establish “a more nimble and effective international peace-building body.” In the eyes of its opponents, the BoP does not remedy the flaws of the international system but instead circumvents them. It thus follows the Trump administration’s consistent policy of weakening the UN system, alongside withdrawals from key UN bodies and cuts in funding.

Concerns have also been raised about the concentration of power vested in President Trump as the chair of the Board. The Charter is drafted in a manner that fully subordinates the BoP to his authority. Although Board decisions are adopted by a simple majority of member states, they are subject to the approval of the chair. Furthermore, the Charter enshrines the personal appointment of Donald Trump as Chair of the board, independent of his continued tenure as President of the United States. In business terms the BoP seems to resemble a Sole Proprietorship.

Reactions at the UN and Future Expectations

Without regard to what they may have said or thought privately about the BoP, UN officials have dismissed concerns expressed by others, saying that it is unlikely that decades of multilateral peacebuilding and wide participation of more than 190 member countries could be replaced.

“There have been any number of organizations — regional organizations, defense alliances and others — that have coexisted with the UN over the 80 years that the UN’s been in existence,” said Farhan Haq, UN deputy spokesperson, adding that it’s “too early to tell what the Board of Peace will look like.” UN Secretary-General Guterres, asked by the BBC if the United Nations can survive the Trump presidency, replied: “I have no doubt about it. …. I have a lot of confidence in the future of humankind, and I’m fighting as much as I can in order to make sure the UN is part of that renewal, that I believe will become inevitable.”

Continuing this theme, the United Nations remains “the only international organization with universal membership,” the UN Secretary-general’s spokesperson, Stephane Dujarric, said in reaction to U.S. President Donald Trump’s inauguration of the Board of Peace. Commenting on the announcement made in Davos, Dujarric said the Secretary-General’s work continues “with a determination to implement the mandates given to us,” stressing that all UN efforts are “underpinned by international law, by the Charter of the UN.” He added that despite new initiatives announced elsewhere, “our work continues.”

During the Council debate on Resolution 2803, Ambassador Waltz of the United States said: “Adopting this resolution today will prove the United Nations can still be a beacon, and not just a bystander.” Yet the follow-up action of the United States in establishing the BoP for implementation of Resolution 2803 seems to have done exactly what Amb. Waltz said that it would not do, namely leave the UN as a bystander.

The Associated Press featured a new headline: “Trump’s wide ambitions for Board of Peace spark new support for the United Nations.” How strong that support will prove to be, and who expresses it, remain to be seen, as the current financial needs of the UN may call for new creativity in resource mobilization for the beleaguered organization.

A key measure of BoP progress will be financial resource mobilization from public and non-traditional sources, as well as — probably — secondment of staff for the ISF and to meet associated diplomatic and support requirements. If the BoP becomes operational in Gaza and develops practical field relationships with the United Nations, the hopes of Resolution 2803 may stand increased chances of being realized. That in itself would be an important accomplishment. The wider ambitions of the BoP Charter may then simply be ignored, as it is unlikely that the BoP as designed can gain sufficient political and financial support to execute its present mandate and operate with the current leadership and decision-making structure.